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Political Risk Insurance: OPIC's Use of
a "Fiduciary Agent" to Facilitate
Resolution of Subrogation Claims
Overseas investment promotes the development of foreign countries,
stimulates employment, and broadens markets for U.S. exports. The de-
veloping nations of the world absorb nearly $100 billion in U.S. exports,
and the market continues to expand. Political risk insurance encourages
private investment in foreign countries through the reduction of risk,
which permits more certainty in the investment decision-making process.
This article discusses political risk insurance issued by the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and OPIC's use of a "fiduciary
agent" to facilitate the prosecution and resolution of subrogation claims
in certain foreign countries. The overall effect of the fiduciary agent con-
cept is to permit the prosecution of subrogation claims in countries that
for domestic reasons did not traditionally provide a subrogation forum
and therefore precluded OPIC from issuing political risk coverage there.
The author views the "fiduciary agent" concept as a favorable develop-
ment in establishing and maintaining good investment climates in these
countries.
I. Historical Background
Congress established OPIC under the Foreign Assistance Act in 1969.
OPIC is a self-sustaining governmental agency, which administers certain
political risk insurance and loan guaranty programs. ' The purpose of the
organization is to facilitate private investment in less-developed countries
*Attorney with Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker in New York, New York.
I. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2194(c), 2195(b), 2196 (1982).
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and to promote the development assistance objectives of the United States
Government. 2
The U.S. government-sponsored insurance program began as part of
the Marshall Plan in 1948. The program was originally designed to en-
courage U.S. investment for the reconstruction effort in war-torn Europe.
More broadly, the program was intended to promote world peace, national
interest, and the foreign policy objectives of the United States. 3 These
objectives included economic concerns over the expected drop in con-
sumer demand after World War I1, and the fostering of democratic
governments. 4
The insurance program initially covered the risk of currency inconver-
tibility, which insures that income from a foreign investment can be con-
verted back into U.S. dollars. Convertibility was a major concern to U.S.
investors at that time. In 1953, the program was extended to encourage
investments in less-developed countries. This expansion of the program
was partially due to the recovery experienced in the Western European
economies, the program also began offering coverage against the risks of
expropriation and war.
In 1961, the program was transferred to the newly formed Agency for
International Development (AID), which was originally established to
facilitate government-to-government assistance. The coverage was fur-
ther broadened to include the risks of revolution and insurrection. Facil-
ities for loan guarantees and feasibility studies were also established. Since
AID's purpose was the administration of intergovernmental assistance,
it was not equipped to administer the volume of work inherent in the
insurance program. In 1969, therefore, Congress determined that a sep-
arate, self-sustaining agency should be established to assist American
investors entering the international market. The agency was OPIC.
In 1971, OPIC began to operate as an agency separate from AID. It
was organized as a corporation and was structured to be responsive to
private business enterprises. OPIC, however, soon met with a number of
substantial claims in Chile, which were inherited from AID's "book of
business." These claims resulted from the expropriation of U.S. invest-
ments nationalized by the Allende Government and amounted to $360
million. Two of the more substantial claims were submitted by the An-
aconda Company and International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT). The
Anaconda claim was for $154 million, and the ITT claim was for $55
2. Id. § 2191.
3. Economic Cooperation Act, 62 Stat. 144 (1948).
4. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT
CORPORATIONS AMENDMENTS ACT, S. REP. No. 676, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1973), re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 517 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 676].
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million. Initially, a question existed as to whether OPIC had the necessary
reserves to cover the exposure.
In 1973, Congress reevaluated the viability of OPIC. The congressional
discussions focused on a number of threshold questions. The first was
whether OPIC furthered the developmental assistance objectives of the
United States. The second was whether OPIC increased the likelihood of
disputes between the United States and the host countries. Finally, Con-
gress turned its attention to OPIC's precarious financial condition. 5
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concluded that OPIC's
insurance guaranty program was only a marginal contributor to the de-
velopment of third-world countries; that it increased the likelihood of
United States Government involvement in the internal policies of the host
countries; and lastly, that there was an inherent conflict with respect to
the achievement of public policy objectives and sound insurance principles.
Congress decided to reauthorize OPIC, but only on the condition that
it transfer insurance operations to the private sector by December 30,
1980. Congress directed OPIC to give preferential treatment to investment
operations in countries with a per capita income of less than $450. It
directed OPIC to give preference to small investors as opposed to large,
multinational companies and not to write coverage for "runaway plants"
or investments that would adversely affect the U.S. balance of payments
or employment.
In 1976, it became apparent that OPIC would be unable to effect pri-
vitization on the schedule established by Congress. This failure was due
to the private sector's disinclination to assume political risks under the
same terms as OPIC. The private sector apparently lacked the resources
to provide commitments in line with U.S. governmental objectives. 6 Also,
foreign private investment declined, which led to further debate in
Congress. 7
In 1978, Congress recognized a marked shift in the attitudes of less-
developed countries toward foreign investment. Significantly, countries
with stringent foreign investment laws began to ease their laws, and the
attitudes of the less-developed countries toward expropriation without
compensation became more flexible. Congress decided that complete pri-
vitization was beyond the "realm of possibility," and withdrew the man-
date to require the complete privitization of OPIC by 1980.
5. S. REP. No. 676, supra note 4.
6. Also, private insurers are required to be profitable, which according to one com-
mentator, is "an objective well beyond the reach of the national schemes today." Paul, New
Developments in Private Political Risk Insurance and Trade Finance, 21 INT'L LAW. 709,
712 (1987).
7. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVEST-
MENT CORPORATIONS AMENDMENTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 670, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 102.
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Congress promulgated specific criteria for OPIC to consider with re-
spect to U.S. developmental objectives. OPIC was prohibited from sup-
porting a project that would result in a significant reduction of U.S.
employment. Then, in 1981, Congress proposed that OPIC's coverage be
extended to include loss due to "civil strife." In 1985, Congress extended
OPIC's mandate until 1988. On October 1, 1988, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1988 was executed by the
President. 8 The legislation authorizes OPIC to continue until September
30, 1992.
In 1986, OPIC supported 124 enterprises in thirty-nine developing coun-
tries and produced an insurance volume of $1.4 billion. Financial com-
mitments of $152.9 million were made in twenty-nine projects. OPIC
experienced a net income of $101.2 million in 1986, and it was optimistic
about the future. 9
1i. Scope of Coverage
To attain its goals, OPIC operates two programs: political risk insurance
and financial services. OPIC political risk insurance affords coverage for
three types of risks, which include expropriation, currency inconverti-
bility, and political violence. The risk of political violence includes war,
revolution, insurrection, and civil strife. Under the finance program, OPIC
operates as a lender or guarantor of funds invested in less-developed
countries.
As noted, inconvertibility coverage protects an investor against the
inability to convert local foreign profits into U.S. dollars. 10 This coverage
extends to loss due to discriminatory exchange rates. The currency, how-
ever, must have been exchangeable for U.S. dollars at the time the in-
surance was issued. The coverage does not extend to mere devaluation
of a currency.
Expropriation coverage protects against loss due to nationalization or
confiscation by a foreign government, including contract repudiation."l
This coverage encompasses creeping expropriation, which is defined as
actions that cumulatively deprive an investor of fundamental rights in an
investment.
OPIC also provides coverage against war, revolution, insurrection, or
civil strife. 12 Civil strife is defined as politically motivated acts of violence,
8. The reauthorization legislation was enacted as part of the FY 1989 Foreign Opera-
tions, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-461.
9. OPIC ANN. REP. (1986).
10. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(a)(1)(A) (1982).
I. Id. §§ 2194(a)(1)(A), 2198(b).
12. Id. § 2194(a)(1)(D) (Supp. IV 1986).
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including terrorism. This type of coverage can be obtained only through
endorsement after the purchase of war, revolution, and insurrection cov-
erage. Loss caused by nonpolitical acts are not covered. The coverage
now includes business interruption due to a covered loss.
The coverage provided by OPIC is currently available in approximately
120 countries. The insurance and guarantees are backed by the full faith
and credit of the United States Government. Projects with which OPIC
is involved, however, must be consistent with U.S. economic and de-
velopment objectives.
OPIC may only issue political risk insurance to "eligible investors." 13
The investment that can be insured or guaranteed includes a loan to an
approved project, purchase of shares in the project, participation in earn-
ings of a project, and furnishing of commodities or services.14 Pursuant
to OPIC's 1988 reauthorization legislation, OPIC must now give prefer-
ential treatment to a country with a per capita annual income of less than
$984 in 1986 U.S. dollars. 15
OPIC is prohibited from "operating" in a state with which the United
States does not have an investment agreement. 16 The investment agree-
ments enumerate the conditions under which OPIC may operate in a
country, and these agreements generally require the investor to assign its
claim to OPIC when the claim is paid. The agreements provide for arbi-
tration of disputes when OPIC and the host country cannot reach a set-
tlement. Also, the host government must approve the project. This approval
provides OPIC with some assurance that the host government is in favor
of the project and will not react adversely to implementation, which would
result in a claim. OPIC can negotiate directly with the host government
after payment of the claim to the investor.
III. Investment Dispute Settlement and Subrogation
OPIC has developed expertise in dispute settlement. When an investor
submits an expropriation claim, a one-year waiting period begins, during
13. Id. § 2198(c). This includes U.S. citizens and companies and certain foreign com-
panies wholly owned by other U.S. companies, provided such foreign companies are 95
percent owned by U.S. companies.
14. 22 U.S.C. § 2198(a) and (b).
15. See Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1988, signed
October I, 1988, as part of the FY 1989 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-461. The new legislation creates an ex-
emption from the income restriction for countries participating in the Caribbean Basin
Initiative. This currently includes the following Caribbean nations: Aruba, Barbados, Ba-
hamas, Netherlands Antilles, and Trinidad and Tobago. The Reauthorization Bill contains
a number of noteworthy changes, the majority of which are beyond the scope of this article.
It nonetheless should be noted that the changes do not affect the "fiduciary agent" concept.
16. Id. § 2197(a).
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which OPIC investigates the claim and attempts to facilitate a settlement
by counseling the investor. A host government may be more apt to reach
a settlement if its payment is made over time and the investor may accept
the payment if it is guaranteed by OPIC.
With respect to the inconvertibility of currency claims, OPIC can pur-
chase the local currency for U.S. dollars and sell it to the U.S. Embassy
in the host country for use in operating expenses. In turn, OPIC's account
can be credited by the Embassy. This system permits OPIC to convert
currency when the central banking system of a country will not do so.
OPIC is required to ensure that "suitable arrangements" exist for the
protection of its interests in connection with an insurance agreement. This
requirement amounts to a congressional mandate that OPIC protect its
right to subrogation in the applicable bilateral investment agreement. Gen-
erally, subrogation is defined as the right of an insurer to be put into the
insured's position for the purpose of pursuing recovery from third parties,
which are legally responsible to the insured for the loss.17 The right ac-
crues upon payment by the insurer to the insured. Subrogation usually
exists by statute, judicial declaration, or agreement between the insurer
and insured. The rationale behind subrogation is to compel discharge of
an obligation by the party that in equity bears responsibility for the loss.
Upon payment of a claim, the investor must assign all interest in an
investment to OPIC.18 OPIC has been very successful in negotiating re-
coveries on its paid claims. The bilateral investment agreements generally
provide that, if after negotiations between the interested governments the
dispute has not been resolved, the matter must be submitted to an arbi-
tration forum. The OPIC insurance contract also provides under section
8.05 that any disputes relating to the policy must be settled by arbitration.
The availability of international arbitration is perceived as a factor in
encouraging negotiated settlements.
IV. The Fiduciary Agent Concept
OPIC is currently operating in approximately 120 countries. Its devel-
opment in South America, however, has been hindered due to apparent
objections by several South American governments to OPIC's mandate
of intergovernmental arbitration. Under the circumstances, therefore, U.S.
investors in this area have not been able to obtain OPIC coverage.
South American countries were historically exposed to abuses of dip-
lomatic protection. The so-called "Calvo Doctrine" emerged as a re-
17. COUCH ON INSURANCE § 61.1 (2d rev. ed. 1983).
18. OPIC, Form 234 KTG 12-85, Contract of Insurance.
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sponse to the institution of diplomatic protection in these countries. The
Doctrine, which was named after a nineteenth-century law professor,
denied that foreign nationals were entitled to diplomatic protection. It
provided that investment disputes between foreign nationals and host
countries had to be settled under domestic law in the local court system.
Under the Calvo Doctrine, the intervention of foreign States in investment
disputes was deemed a violation of the territorial jurisdiction of the host
State. 19 The Doctrine rejected the viability of intergovernmental arbitra-
tion as a method for dispute resolution.
The Constitutions and laws of many South American countries contain
principles of the Calvo Doctrine. In 1969, the Andean Pact 20 contained a
clause that precluded the withdrawal of investment disputes from local
courts. Elements of the Calvo Doctrine have also appeared in the 1974
Charter of Economics, Rights and Duties of States, which was drafted,
in part, by Mexico.
OPIC has been required to demonstrate that its participation in South
America is compatible with elements of the Calvo Doctrine, because the
arbitral requirement in the OPIC legislation conflicts with the Calvo Doc-
trine's mandate that investment disputes be litigated in the local court
system.
On November 28, 1984, the U.S. executed an Investment Guaranty
Treaty with Ecuador that permitted OPIC to write political risk insurance
in that country after an absence of thirteen years. This agreement was
the first of its kind executed with a member of the Andean Pact. On April
3, 1985, a similar Investment Guaranty Agreement was executed with
Colombia. 21 Terms used in negotiations with Uruguay in 1982 and Chile
in 1983 proved helpful in the Ecuadorean negotiations.
Article 6(a) of the Treaty between the U.S. and Ecuador provides that
the parties may refer any dispute arising out of the project to arbitration
if, at the end of three months following a request for negotiations, the
governments have not resolved their disputes. Under article 6(b), how-
ever, the treaty provides that the United States is obligated to exhaust
local remedies in Ecuador before seeking arbitration under article 6(a).
19. "Constitutional or statutory provisions in Latin American countries sometimes bar
ownership of real property by a foreign government .... Similarly, the Calvo Doctrine is
considered by many such countries to inhibit them from recognizing U.S. subrogation to
claims, or agreement to negotiate and arbitrate such claims." International Development &
Security, 1961: Hearings on S. 1983 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 282 (1961).
20. The members of the Andean Pact include Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and
Venezuela.
21. See Introductory Note, Investment Guaranty Agreements with Ecuador and Colom-
bia, 24 I.L.M. 566 (1984).
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This provision apparently satisfied Ecuador's concern for initial retention
of jurisdiction in local courts. The United States did not view article 6(b)
as a problem because customary international law requires the exhaustion
of local remedies. Generally, international law provides that private in-
dividuals must exhaust remedies available under the municipal law of a
State before an "international action" is brought against the State. The
United States Government is subject to this rule because its rights are
the same as the "investor" to whom it is subrogated after payment of
the claim.
Article 3(a) of the Treaty provides that OPIC will assign its subrogated
rights to a "fiduciary agent," which will pursue any claim in Ecuador.
Under article 4(a), Ecuador agrees to recognize the transfer of rights to
the agent. This "assignment" avoids a direct, politicized controversy
between the United States and Ecuador in an Ecuadorean court. This
confrontation would otherwise be unavoidable due to the Ecuadorean
court's retention of initial jurisdiction pursuant to the Calvo Doctrine.
OPIC facilities in South America have proven to benefit U.S. private
investment. The Treaty with Equador facilitated establishment of a feed
mill and hatchery at an Ecuadorean shrimp farm. In this transaction, OPIC
made loans to a U.S. investor of $2.7 million. The operation generated a
number of jobs, and earnings of nearly $15 million in foreign exchange
are projected for Ecuador over the next five years. Consequently, certain
national objectives of the OPIC program have been realized. The Treaty
opened markets for U.S. exports and assisted development in a third
world country. In addition, in 1986, OPIC executed Investment Guaranty
Agreements with Bolivia and Argentina.
V. Conclusion
The continued issuance of political risk insurance by OPIC encourages
further investment in Ecuador and the other South American countries.
In fact, Ecuador recently eased some of its foreign investment laws. 22
The Ecuadorean Government modified regulations to permit foreign inves-
tors to own a 25 percent capital basis in private companies. Similarly,
OPIC reported loan facilities that will assist in the development of oil and
gas facilities, and gold and silver mining in Bolivia. OPIC-insured in-
vestments in Chile are also reported, although issuance of new investment
insurance in that country has recently been suspended. While other do-
mestic and economic factors may account for this more favorable foreign
22. Ecuador has continued to relax foreign investment laws. See Regional Developments:
Latin America, 21 INT'L LAW. 243, 245 (1987).
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investment attitude, political risk insurance certainly plays a role in fa-
cilitating the participation of U.S. companies.
OPIC coverage for South American investments was heretofore ham-
pered because of the apparent inconsistencies between the Calvo Doctrine
and OPIC's mandate of intergovernmental arbitration. The "fiduciary
agent" concept now avoids a politicized subrogation claim between the
United States and Ecuador in an Ecuadorean court. This development
should ensure that disputes will be settled on the basis of legal criteria
without direct governmental confrontations. The result should be a pos-
itive affect on our economy as well as on the stimulation of host country
operations.
The need for overseas investment is no longer questioned, and it is
important for U.S. companies to compete effectively in the international
market. Without political risk insurance in general, and OPIC coverage
in particular, U.S. private overseas business would not be as significant
as it is today. The establishment and maintenance of favorable and stable
investment climates is in the best interest of all concerned.
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